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Abstract
Public infrastructure-as-a-service clouds, such as Amazon
EC2, Google Compute Engine (GCE) and Microsoft Azure
allow clients to run virtual machines (VMs) on shared phys-
ical infrastructure. This practice of multi-tenancy brings
economies of scale, but also introduces the risk of sharing a
physical server with an arbitrary and potentially malicious
VM. Past works have demonstrated how to place a VM
alongside a target victim (co-location) in early-generation
clouds and how to extract secret information via side-
channels. Although there have been numerous works on
side-channel attacks, there have been no studies on place-
ment vulnerabilities in public clouds since the adoption
of stronger isolation technologies such as Virtual Private
Clouds (VPCs).
We investigate this problem of placement vulnerabili-
ties and quantitatively evaluate three popular public clouds
for their susceptibility to co-location attacks. We find that
adoption of new technologies (e.g., VPC) makes many prior
attacks, such as cloud cartography, ineffective. We find new
ways to reliably test for co-location across Amazon EC2,
Google GCE, and Microsoft Azure. We also find ways to
detect co-location with victim web servers in a multi-tiered
cloud application located behind a load balancer.
We use our new co-residence tests and multiple customer
accounts to launch VM instances under different strategies
that seek to maximize the likelihood of co-residency.
We find that it is much easier (10× higher success rate)
and cheaper (up to $114 less) to achieve co-location in
these three clouds when compared to a secure reference
placement policy.
Keywords: co-location detection, multi-tenancy, cloud se-
curity
∗This is the full version of an earlier paper published at USENIX Se-
curity 2015 [32].
†Work primarily done while at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1 Introduction
Public cloud computing offers easy access to relatively
cheap compute and storage resources. Cloud providers are
able to sustain this cost-effective solution through multi-
tenancy, where the infrastructure is shared between com-
putations run by arbitrary customers over the Internet. This
increases utilization compared to dedicated infrastructure,
allowing lower prices.
However, this practice of multi-tenancy also enables var-
ious security attacks in the public cloud. Should an ad-
versary be able to launch a virtual machine on the same
physical host as a victim, making the two VMs co-resident
(sometimes the term co-located is used), there exist attacks
that break the logical isolation provided by virtualization to
breach confidentiality [30, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40] or degrade the
performance [31, 41] of the victim. Perhaps most notable
are the side-channel attacks that steal private keys across the
virtual-machine isolation boundary by cleverly monitoring
shared resource usage [37, 39, 40].
Less understood is the ability of adversaries to arrange
for co-residency in the first place. In general, doing so
consists of using a launch strategy together with a mech-
anism for co-residency detection. The only prior work
on obtaining co-residency [30] showed simple network-
topology-based co-residency checks along with low-cost
launch strategies that obtain a high probability of achieving
co-residency compared to simply launching as many VM
instances as possible. When such advantageous strategies
exist, we say the cloud suffers from a placement vulnera-
bility. Since then, Amazon has made several changes to
their architecture, including removing the ability to do the
simplest co-residency check. Whether placement vulnera-
bilities exist in other public clouds has, to the best of our
knowledge, never been explored.
In this work, we provide a framework to systematically
evaluate public clouds for placement vulnerabilities and
show that three popular public cloud providers may be vul-
nerable to co-location attacks. More specifically, we set out
to answer four questions:
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• Can co-residency be effectively detected in modern
public clouds?
• Are known launch strategies [30] still effective in mod-
ern clouds?
• Are there any new exploitable placement vulnerabili-
ties?
• Can we quantify the money and time required of an
adversary to achieve a certain probability of success?
We start by exploring the efficacy of prior co-residency
tests (§ 4) and develop more reliable tests for our place-
ment study (§ 4.1). We also find a novel test to detect co-
residency with VMs uncontrolled by the attacker by just us-
ing their public interface even when they are behind a load
balancer (§ 4.3).
We use multiple customer accounts across three popu-
lar cloud providers, launch VM instances under different
scenarios that may affect the placement algorithm, and test
for co-residency between all launched instances. We ana-
lyze three popular cloud providers, Amazon Elastic Com-
pute Cloud (EC2) [2], Google Compute Engine (GCE) [6]
and Microsoft Azure (Azure) [16], for vulnerabilities in
their placement algorithm. After exhaustive experimenta-
tion with each of these cloud providers and at least 190 runs
per cloud provider, we show that an attacker can still suc-
cessfully arrange for co-location (§ 5). We find new launch
strategies in these three clouds that obtain co-location faster
(10x higher success rate) and cheaper (up to $114 less)
when compared to a secure reference placement policy.
Next, we start by giving some background on public
clouds (§ 2) and then define our threat model (§ 3). We con-
clude the paper with related and future work (§ 6 and § 7,
respectively).
2 Background
Public clouds. Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) public
clouds, such as Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine and
Microsoft Azure, provide a management interface for cus-
tomers to launch and terminate VM instances with a user-
specified configuration. Typically, users register with the
cloud provider for an account and use the cloud interface
to specify VM configuration, which includes instance type,
disk image, data center or region to host the VMs, and then
launch VM instances. In addition, public clouds also pro-
vide many higher-level services that monitor load and auto-
matically launch or terminate instances based on the work-
load [4,8,14]. These services internally use the same mech-
anisms as users to configure, launch and terminate VMs.
The provider’s VM launch service receives from a client
a desired set of parameters describing the configuration of
the VM. The service then allocates resources for the new
VM; this process is called VM provisioning. We are most
interested in the portion of VM provisioning that selects the
Type Variable
# of customers
# of instances launched per customer
Placement Instance type
Parameters Data Center (DC) or Region
Time launched
Cloud provider
Time of the day
Environment Days of the week
Variable Number of in-use VMs
Number of machines in DC
Figure 1: List of placement variables.
physical host to run a VM, which we call the VM place-
ment algorithms. The resulting VM-to-host mapping we
call the VM placement. The placement for a specific virtual
machine may depend on many factors: the load on each
machine, the number of machines in the data center, the
number of concurrent VM launch requests, etc.
While cloud providers do not generally publish their VM
placement algorithms, there are several variables under the
control of the user that could affect the VM placement, such
as time-of-day, requested data center, and number of in-
stances. A list of some notable parameters are given in
Figure 1. By controlling these variables, an adversary can
partially influence the placement of VMs on physical ma-
chines that may also host a target set of VMs. We call these
variables placement variables and the set of values for these
variables form a launch strategy. An example launch strat-
egy is to launch 20 instances 10 minutes after triggering an
auto-scale event on a victim application. This is, in fact, a
launch strategy suggested by prior work [30].
Placement policies. VM placement algorithms used in
public clouds often aim to increase data center efficiency,
quality of service, or both by realizing some placement pol-
icy. For instance, a policy that aims to increase data center
utilization may pack launched VMs on a single machine.
Similarly policies that optimize the time to provision a VM,
which involves fetching an image over the network to the
physical machine and booting, may choose the last machine
that used the same VM image, as it may already have the
VM image cached on local disks. Policies may vary across
cloud providers, and even within a provider.
Public cloud placement policies, although undocu-
mented, often exhibit behavior that is externally observable.
One example is parallel placement locality [30], in which
VMs launched from different accounts within a short time
window are often placed on the same physical machine.
Two instances launched sequentially, where the first in-
stance is terminated before the launch of the second one, are
often placed on the same physical machine, a phenomenon
called sequential placement locality [30].
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These placement behaviors are artifacts of the two place-
ment policies described earlier, respectively. Other exam-
ples of policies and resulting behaviors exist as well. VMs
launched from the same accounts may either be packed
on the same physical machine to maximize locality (and
hence co-resident with themselves) or striped across differ-
ent physical machines to maximize redundancy (and hence
never co-resident with themselves). In the course of normal
usage, such behaviors are unlikely to be noticed, but they
can be measured with careful experiments.
Launch strategies. An adversary can exploit placement
behaviors to increase the likelihood of co-locating with tar-
get victims. As pointed out by Ristenpart et al. [30], parallel
placement locality can be exploited by triggering a scale-up
event on target victim by increasing their load, which will
cause more victim VMs to launch. The adversary can then
simultaneously (or after a time lag) launch multiple VMs
some of which may be co-located with the newly launched
victim VM(s).
In this study, we develop a framework to systematically
evaluate public clouds against launch strategies and uncover
previously unknown placement behaviors. We approach
this study by (i) identifying a set of placement variables
that characterize a VM, (ii) enumerating the most inter-
esting values for these variables, and (iii) quantifying the
cost of such a strategy, if it in fact exposes a co-residency
vulnerability. We repeat this for three major public cloud
providers: Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine, and Mi-
crosoft Azure. Note that the goal of this study is not to re-
verse engineer the exact details of the placement policies,
but rather to identify launch strategies that can be exploited
by an adversary.
Co-residency detection. A key technique for understand-
ing placement vulnerabilities is detecting when VMs are
co-resident on the same physical machine (also termed
co-locate). Ristenpart et al. [30] proposed several co-
residency detection techniques and used them to identify
several placement vulnerabilities in Amazon EC2. As co-
resident status is not reported directly by the cloud provider,
these detection methods are usually referred to as side-
channel based techniques, which can be further classified
into two categories: logical side-channels or performance
side-channels.
Logical side-channels: Logical side-channels allow infor-
mation leakage via logical resources that are observable to
a software program, e.g., IP addresses, timestamp counter
values. Particularly in Amazon EC2, each VM is assigned
two IP addresses, a public IP address for communication
over the Internet, and a private or internal IP address for
intra-datacenter communications. The EC2 cloud infras-
tructure allowed translation of public IP addresses to their
internal counterparts. This translation revealed the topology
of the internal data center network, which allowed a remote
adversary to map the entire public cloud infrastructure and
determine, for example, the availability zone and instance
type of a victim. Furthermore, co-resident VMs tended to
have adjacent internal IP addresses.
Logical side-channels can also be established via shared
timestamp counters. In prior work, skew in timestamp
counters were used to fingerprint a physical machine [28],
although this technique has not yet been explored for co-
residency detection. Co-residency detection can possibly
be performed via any shared software state between the two
customers. In the context of container-based platform-as-
a-service (PaaS) clouds, where customers share the same
operating system, example of logical side-channels include
interrupt counts and process statistics reported in procfs.
Performance side-channels: Performance side-channels
are created when performance variations due to resource
contention are observable. Such variations can be used as
an indicator of co-residency. For instance, network perfor-
mance has been used for detecting co-residence [30, 31].
This is because hypervisors often directly relay network
traffic between VMs on the same host, providing detectably
shorter round-trip times than between VMs on different
hosts.
Covert channels, as a special case of side-channels, can
be established between two VMs that are cooperating in or-
der to detect co-residency. For purposes of co-residency
detection, covert channels based on shared hardware re-
sources, such as last level caches (LLCs) or local storage
disks, can be exploited by one VM to detect performance
degradation caused by a co-resident VM. Covert channel
detection techniques require control over both VMs, and
are usually used in experimentation rather than in practical
attacks. We later refer to such approaches as cooperative
co-residency detection.
Placement study in PaaS. While we mainly studied
placement vulnerabilities in the context of IaaS, we also ex-
perimented with Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) clouds. PaaS
clouds offer elastic application hosting services. Unlike
IaaS where users are granted full control of a VM, PaaS
provides managed compute tasks (or instances) for the exe-
cution of hosted web applications, and allow multiple such
instances to share the same operating system. These clouds
use either process-level isolation via file system access con-
trols, or increasingly Linux-style containers (see [40] for a
more detailed description). As such, logical side-channels
alone are usually sufficient for co-residency detection pur-
poses. For instance, in PaaS clouds, co-resident instances
often share the same public IP address as the host machine.
This is because the host-to-instance network is often con-
figured using Network Address Translation (NAT) and each
instance is assigned a unique port under the host IP address
for incoming connections.
We found that many such logical side-channel-based co-
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residency detection approaches worked on PaaS clouds,
even on those using containers. Specifically, we used both
system-level interrupt statistics via /proc/interrupts
and shared public IP addresses of the instances to detect
co-location in Heroku [10]. Note that both these techniques
either require direct access to victim instances, or a soft-
ware vulnerability to access procfs or initiate reverse con-
nections, respectively.
Our brief investigation of co-location attacks in
Heroku [11] showed that naı¨ve strategies like scaling two
PaaS web applications to 30 instances with a time interval
of 5 minutes between them, resulted in co-location in 6 out
of 10 attempts. Moreover, since the co-location detection
was simple and quick including the time taken for appli-
cation scaling, we were able to do these experiments free
of cost. This result reinforces prior findings on PaaS co-
location attacks [40] and confirms the existence of cheap
launch strategies to achieve co-location and easy detection
mechanisms to verify it. We do not investigate PaaS clouds
further in the rest of this paper.
3 Threat Model
Co-residency attacks in public clouds, as mentioned earlier,
involve two steps: a launch strategy and co-residency de-
tection. We assume that the adversary has access to tools
to identify a set of target victims, and either knows vic-
tim VMs’ launch characteristics or can directly trigger their
launches. The latter is possible by increasing load in order
to cause the victim to scale up by launching more instances.
The focus of this study is to identify if there exists any
launch strategy that an adversary can devise to increase the
chance of co-residency with a set of targeted victim VMs.
In our threat model, we assume that the cloud provider is
trusted and the attacker has no affiliation of any form with
the cloud provider. This also means that the adversary has
no internal knowledge of the placement policies that are re-
sponsible for the VM placements in the public cloud. An
adversary also has the same interface for launching and ter-
minated VMs as regular customers, and no other special
interfaces. Even though there may be per-account limits on
the number of VMs that a cloud provider imposes, an ad-
versary has access to an unlimited number of accounts and
hence has no limit on the number of VMs he could launch
at any given time.
No resource-limited cloud provider is a match to an ad-
versary with limitless resources and hence realistically we
assume that the adversary is resource-limited. For the same
reason, a cloud provider is vulnerable to a launch strategy
only when it is trivial or cost-effective for an adversary. As
such, we aim to (i) quantify the cost of executing a launch
strategy by an adversary, (ii) define a reference placement
policy with which the placement policies of real clouds can
be compared, and (iii) define metrics to quantify a place-
ment vulnerability as existing when there are cost-effective
launch strategies that do better than they would against the
reference policy.
Cost of a launch strategy. Quantifying the cost of a
launch strategy is straightforward: it is the cost of launching
a number of VMs and running tests to detect co-residency
with one or more target victim VMs. To be precise, the cost
of a launch strategy S is given by CS = a ·P(atype) ·Td(v,a).
Here a is the number of attacker VMs of type atype launched
to get co-located with one of the v victim VMs. P(atype) is
the price of running one VM of type atype for a unit time.
Td(a,v) is the time (in billing units) to detect co-residency
between all pairs of a attackers and v victim VMs, exclud-
ing pairs within each group. For simplicity, we assume
that the attacker is running all instances until the last co-
residency check completes or that, equivalently. When the
time to finish co-residency checks is within the granularity
of one unit of billing time (e.g., one hour on EC2), this is
equivalent to a more refined model.
Reference placement policy. In order to define placement
vulnerability, we need a yardstick to compare various place-
ment policies and the launch strategies that they may be
vulnerable to. To aid this purpose, we define a simple ref-
erence placement policy that has good security properties
against co-residency attacks and use it to gauge the place-
ment policies used in public clouds. Let there be N ma-
chines in a data center and let each machine have unlimited
capacity. Given a set of unordered VM launch requests, the
mapping of each VM to a machine follows a uniform ran-
dom distribution. Let there be v victim VMs assigned to v
unique machines among N, where v N. The probability
of at least one collision (i.e. co-residency) under the ran-
dom placement policy and the above attack scenario when
attacker launches a instances is given by 1− (1− v/N)a.
We call this probability the reference probability.∗ Recall
that for calculating the cost of a launch strategy under this
reference policy, we also need to define the price function,
P(vmtype). For simplicity, we use the most competitive min-
imum price offered by any cloud provider as the price for
the compute resource under the reference policy. For exam-
ple, at the time of this study, Amazon EC2 offered t2.small
instances at $0.026 per hour of instance activity, which was
the cheapest price across all three clouds considered in this
study.
Note that the reference placement policy makes several
simplifying assumptions, but these only benefit the attacker.
This is conservative as we will compare our experimental
results to the best possible launch strategy under the ref-
erence policy. For instance, the assumption on unlimited
capacity of the servers only benefits the attacker as it never
limits the number of victim VMs an attacker could poten-
tially co-locate with. We use a conservative value of 1000
∗This probability event follows a hypergeometric distribution.
4
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(%
)
Minimum Network RTT (ms)
Non-coresident
Co-resident
(a) GCE
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(%
)
Minimum Network RTT (ms)
Non-coresident
Co-resident
(b) EC2
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(%
)
Minimum Network RTT (ms)
Non-coresident
Co-resident
(c) Azure
Figure 2: Histogram of minimum network round trip times between pairs of VMs. The frequency is represented as a fraction of total
number of pairs in each category. The figure does not show the tail of the histogram.
for N, which is at least an order-of-magnitude less than the
number of servers (50,000) in the smallest reported Ama-
zon EC2 data centers [5]. Similarly, the price function of
this placement policy also favors an attacker as it provides
the cheapest price possible in the market even though in re-
ality a secure placement policy may demand a higher price.
Hence, it would be troubling if the state-of-the-art place-
ment policies used in public clouds does not measure well
even against such a conservative reference placement pol-
icy.
Placement Vulnerability. Putting it all together, we de-
fine two metrics to gauge any launch strategy against a
placement policy: (i) normalized success rate, and (ii) cost-
benefit. The normalized success rate is the success rate of
the launch strategy in the cloud under test normalized to
the success rate of the same strategy under the reference
placement policy. The cost-benefit of a strategy is the addi-
tional cost that is incurred by the adversary in the reference
placement policy to achieve the same success rate as the
strategy in the placement policy under test. We define that a
placement policy has a placement vulnerability if and only
if there exists a launch strategy with a normalized success
rate that is greater than 1.
Note that the normalized success rate quantifies how easy
it is to get co-location. On the other hand, the cost benefit
metric helps to quantify how cheap it is to get co-location
compared to a more secure placement policy. These metrics
can be used to compare launch strategies under different
placement policies, where a higher value for any of these
metrics indicate that the placement policy is relatively more
vulnerable to that launch strategy. An ideal placement pol-
icy should aim to reduce both the success rate and the cost
benefit of any strategy.
4 Detecting Co-Residence
An essential prerequisite for the placement vulnerability
study is access to a co-residency detection technique that
identifies whether two VMs are resident on the same phys-
ical machine in a third-party public cloud.
Challenges in modern clouds. Applying the detection
techniques mentioned in Section 2 is no longer feasible in
modern clouds. In part due to the vulnerability disclo-
sure by Ristenpart et al. [30], modern public clouds have
adopted new technologies that enhance the isolation be-
tween cloud tenants and thwart known co-residence detec-
tion techniques. In the network layer, virtual private clouds
(VPCs) have been broadly employed for data center man-
agement [18,21]. With VPCs, internal IP addresses are pri-
vate to a cloud tenant, and can no longer be used for cloud
cartography. Although EC2 allowed this in older genera-
tion instances (called EC2-classic), this is no longer pos-
sible under Amazon VPC setting. In addition, VPCs re-
quire communication between tenants to use public IP ad-
dresses for communication. As shown in Figure 2, the net-
work timing test is also defeated, as using public IP ad-
dresses seems to involve routing in the data center network
rather than short-circuiting through the hypervisor. Here,
the ground-truth of co-residency is detected using memory-
based covert-channel (described later in this section). No-
tice that there is no clear distinction between the frequency
distribution of the network round trip times of co-resident
and non-coresident pairs on all three clouds.
In the system layer, persistent storage using local disks
is no longer the default. For instance, many Amazon EC2
instance types do not support local storage [1]; GCE and
Azure provide only local Solid State Drives (SSD) [7, 15],
which are less susceptible to detectable delays from long
seeks. In addition, covert channels based on last-level
caches [30, 31, 35, 38] are less reliable in modern clouds
that use multiple CPU packages. Two VMs sharing the
same machine may not share LLCs to establish the covert
channel. Hence, these LLC-based covert-channels can only
capture a subset of co-resident instances.
As a result of these technology changes, none of the prior
techniques for detecting co-residency reliably work in mod-
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ern clouds, compelling us to develop new approaches for
our study.
4.1 Co-residency Tests
We describe in this subsection a pair of tools for co-
residency tests, with the following design goals:
• Applicable to a variety of heterogeneous software and
hardware stacks used in public clouds.
• Detect co-residency with high confidence: the false de-
tection rate should be low even in the presence of back-
ground noise from other neighboring VMs.
• Detect co-residency fast enough to facilitate experimen-
tation among large sets of VMs.
We chose a performance covert-channel based detection
technique that exploits shared hardware resources, as this
type of covert-channels are often hard to remove and most
clouds are very likely to be vulnerable to it.
A covert-channel consists of a sender and a receiver. The
sender creates contention for a shared resource and uses it
to signal another tenant that potentially share the same re-
source. The receiver, on the other hand, senses this con-
tention by periodically measuring the performance of that
shared resource. A significant performance degradation
measured at the receiver results in a successful detection of
a sender’s signal. Here the reliability of the covert-channel
is highly dependent on the choice of the shared resource and
the level of contention created by the sender. The sender is
the key component of the co-residency detection techniques
we developed as part of this study.
// allocate memory multiples of 64 bits
char_ptr = allocate_memory((N+1)*8)
//move half word up
unaligned_addr = char_ptr + 2
loop forever:
loop i from (1..N):
atomic_op(unaligned_addr + i, some_value)
end loop
end loop
Figure 3: Memory-locking – Sender.
Memory-locking sender. Modern x86 processors sup-
port atomic memory operations, such as XADD for atomic
addition, and maintain their atomicity using cache coher-
ence protocols. However, when a locked operation extends
across a cache-line boundary, the processor may lock the
memory bus temporarily [34]. This locking of the bus can
be detected as it slows down other uses of the bus, such
as fetching data from DRAM. Hence, when used properly,
it provides a timing covert channel to send a signal to an-
other VM. Unlike cache-based covert channels, this tech-
nique works regardless of whether VMs share a CPU core
or package.
We developed a sender exploiting this shared memory-
bus covert-channel. The psuedocode for the sender is
shown in Figure 3. The sender creates a memory buffer and
uses pointer arithmetic to force atomic operations on un-
aligned memory addresses. This indirectly locks the mem-
ory bus even on all modern processor architectures [34].
size = LLC_size * (LLC_ways +1)
stride = LLC_sets * cacheline_sz)
buffer = alloc_ptr_chasing_buff(size, stride)
loop sample from (1..10): //number of samples
start_rdtsc = rdtsc()
loop probes from (1..10000):
probe(buffer); //always hits memory
end loop
time_taken[sample] = (rdtsc() - start_rdtsc)
end loop
Figure 4: Memory-probing – Receiver.
Receivers. With the aforementioned memory-locking
sender, there are several ways to sense the memory-locking
contention induced by the sender in another co-resident ten-
ant instance. All the receivers measure the memory band-
width of the shared system. We present two types of re-
ceivers that we used in this study that works on heteroge-
neous hardware configurations.
Memory-probing receiver uses carefully crafted memory re-
quests that always miss in the cache hierarchy and always
hit memory. This is ensured by constricting the data ac-
cesses of the receiver into a single LLC set. In order to evade
hardware prefetching, we use a pointer-chasing buffer to
randomly access a list of memory addresses (pseudocode
shown in Figure 4). The time needed to complete a fixed
number of probes (e.g., 10,000) provides a signal of co-
residence: when the sender is performing locked opera-
tions, loads from memory proceed slowly.
Memory-locking receiver is similar to the sender but mea-
sures the number of unaligned atomic operations that could
be completed per unit time. Although it also measures the
memory bandwidth, unlike the memory-probing receiver, it
works even when the cache architecture of the machine is
unknown.
The sender along with these two receivers form our
two novel co-residency detection methods that we use in
this study: memory-probing test and memory-locking test
(named after their respective receivers). These comprise
our co-residency test suite. Each test in the suite starts by
running the receiver on one VM while keeping the other
idle. The performance measured by this run is the baseline
performance without contention. Then the receiver and the
sender are run together. If the receiver detects decreased
performance, the tests conclude that the two VMs are co-
resident. We use a slowdown threshold to detect when the
change in receiver performance indicates co-residence (dis-
cussed later in the section).
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Machine Cores Memory Memory Socket
Architecture Probing Locking
Xeon E5645 6 3.51 1.79 Same
Xeon X5650 12 3.61 1.77 Same
Xeon X5650 12 3.46 1.55 Diff.
Figure 5: Memory-probing and -locking on testbed machines.
Slowdown relative to the baseline performance observed by the
receiver averaged across 10 samples. Same – sender and receiver
on different cores on the same socket, Diff. – sender and receiver
on different cores on different sockets. Xeon E5645 machine had
a single socket.
Evaluation on local testbed. In order to measure the effi-
cacy of this covert-channel we ran tests in our local testbed.
Results of running memory-probing and -locking tests un-
der various configurations are shown in Figure 5. The hard-
ware architectures of these machines are similar to what is
observed in the cloud [22]. Across these hardware con-
figurations, we observed a performance degradation of at
least 3.4× compared to not running memory-locking sender
on a non-coresident instance (i.e. a baseline run with idle
sender), indicating reliability. Note that this works even
when the co-resident instances are running on cores on dif-
ferent sockets, which does not share the same LLC (works
on heterogeneous hardware). Further, a single run takes one
tenth of a second to complete and hence is also quick.
Note that for this test suite to work in the real world,
an attacker requires control over both the VMs under test,
which includes the victim. We call this scenario as co-
residency detection under cooperative victims (in short, co-
operative co-residency detection). Such a mechanism is
sufficient to observe placement behavior in public clouds
(Section 4.2). We further investigated approaches to detect
co-residency under a realistic setting with an uncooperative
victim. In Section 4.3 we show how to adapt the memory-
probing test to detect co-location with one of the many web-
servers behind a load balancer.
4.2 Cooperative Co-residency Detection
In this section, we describe the methodology we used to
detect co-residency in public clouds. For the purposes of
studying placement policies, we had the flexibility to con-
trol both VMs that we test for co-residence. We did this by
launching VMs from two separate accounts and test them
for pairwise co-residence. We encountered several chal-
lenges when running the co-residency test suite on three
different public clouds - Google Computer Engine, Ama-
zon EC2 and Microsoft Azure.
First, we had to handle noise from neighboring VMs
sharing the same host. Second, hardware and software het-
erogeneity in the three different public clouds required spe-
cial tuning process for the co-residency detection tests. Fi-
nally, testing co-residency for a large set of VMs demanded
a scalable implementation. We elaborate on our solution to
these challenges below.
Cloud Machine Clock LLC
Provider Architecture (GHz) (Ways × Set)
EC2 Intel Xeon E5-2670 2.50 20 × 20480
GCE Generic Xeon* 2.60* 20 × 16384
Azure Intel E5-2660 2.20 20 × 16384
Azure AMD Opteron 4171 HE 2.10 48 × 1706
Figure 6: Machine configuration in public clouds. The machine
configurations observed over all runs with small instance types.
GCE did not reveal the exact microarchitecture of the physical
host (*). Ways × Sets ×Word Size gives the LLC size. The word
size for all these x86-64 machines is 64 bytes.
Handling noise. Any noise from neighboring VMs could
affect the performance of the receiver with and without the
signal (or baseline) and result in misdetection. To han-
dle such noise, we alternate between measuring the perfor-
mance with and without the sender’s signal, such that any
noise equally affects both the measurements. Secondly, we
take ten samples of each measurement and only detect co-
residence if the ratios of both the mean and median of these
samples exceed the threshold. As each run takes a frac-
tion of a second to complete, repeating 10 times is still fast
enough.
Tuning thresholds. As expected, we encountered differ-
ent machine configurations on the three different public
clouds (shown in Figure 6) with heterogeneous cache di-
mensions, organizations and replacement policies [12, 27].
This affects the performance degradation observed by the
receivers with respect to the baseline and the ideal thresh-
old for detecting co-residency. This is important because
the thresholds we use to detect co-residence yield false pos-
itives, if set too low, and false negatives if set too high.
Hence, we tuned the threshold to each hardware we found
on all three clouds.
We started with a conservative threshold of 1.5× and
tuned to a final threshold of 2× for GCE and EC2 and
1.5× for Azure for both the memory-probing and -locking
tests. Figure 7 shows the distribution of performance degra-
dation under the memory-probing tests across Intel ma-
chines in EC2, GCE, and Azure. For GCE and EC2, a
performance degradation threshold of 2 clearly separates
co-resident from non-coresident instances. For all Intel
machines we encountered, although we ran both memory-
locking and -probing tests, memory-probing was sufficient
to detect co-residency. For Azure, overall we observe lower
performance degradation and the initial threshold of 1.5 was
sufficient to detect co-location on Intel machines.
The picture for AMD machines in Azure differs signif-
icantly as shown in Figure 8. The distribution of perfor-
mance degradation for both memory-locking and memory-
probing shows that, unlike for other architectures, co-
residency detection is highly sensitive to the choice of the
threshold for AMD machines. This may be due to the
more associative cache (48 ways vs. 20 for Intel), or differ-
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Figure 7: Distribution of performance degradation of memory-probing test. For varying number of pairs on each cloud (GCE:29,
EC2:300, Azure:278). Note the x-axis plots performance degradation. Also for EC2 x-axis range is cut short at 20 pairs for clarity.
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Figure 8: Distribution of performance degradation of memory-
probing and -locking tests. On AMD machines in Azure with
40 pairs of nodes. Here NC stands for non-coresident and C, co-
resident pairs. Note that the x-axis plots performance degradation.
ent handling of locked instructions. For these machines, a
threshold of 1.5 was high enough to have no false positives,
which we verified by hand checking the instances using the
two covert-channels and observed consistent performance
degradation of at least 50%. We determine a pair of VMs as
co-resident if the degradation in either of the tests is above
this threshold. We did not detect any cross-architecture
(false) co-residency detection in any of the runs.
Scaling co-residency detection tests. Testing co-
residency at scale is time-consuming and increases quadrat-
ically with the number of instances: checking 40 VM in-
stances, involves 780 pair-wise tests. Even if each run of
the entire co-residency test suite takes only 10 seconds, a
naı¨ve sequential execution of the tests on all the pairs will
take 2 hours. Parallel co-residency checks can speed check-
ing, but concurrent tests may interfere with each other.
To parallelize the test, we partition the set of all VM pairs
(
(v+a
2
)
) into sets of pairs with no VMs twice; we run one of
these sets at a time and record which pairs detected possible
co-residence. After running all sets, we have a set of can-
didate co-resident pairs, which we test sequentially. Paral-
lelizing co-residency tests significantly decreased the time
taken to test all co-residency pairs. For instance, the par-
allel version of the test on one of the cloud providers took
2.4 seconds per pair whereas the serial version took almost
46.3 seconds per pair (a speedup of 20x). While there are
faster ways to parallelize co-residency detection, we chose
this approach for simplicity.
Veracity of our tests. Notice that a performance degra-
dation of 1.5x, 2x and 4x corresponds to 50%, 100% and
300% performance degradation. Such high performance
degradation (even 50%) is clear enough signal to declare co-
residency due to resource sharing. Furthermore, we hand
checked by running the two tests in isolation on the de-
tected instance-pairs for a significant fraction of the runs
for all clouds and observed a consistent covert-channel sig-
nal. Thus our methodology did not detect any false pos-
itives, which are more detrimental to our study than false
negatives. Although co-residency here implies sharing of
memory channel, which may not always mean sharing of
cores or other per-core hardware resources.
4.3 Co-residency Detection on Uncooperative
Victims
Until now, we described a method to detect co-residency
with a cooperative victim. In this section, we look at a
more realistic setting where an adversary wishes to de-
tect co-residency with a victim VM with accesses limited
to only public interfaces like HTTP or a key-value (KV)
store’s put-get interface. We show that the basic coopera-
tive co-residency detection can also be employed to detect
co-residency with an uncooperative victim in the wild.
Attack setting. Unlike previous attack scenarios, we as-
sume the attacker has no access to the victim VMs or its
application other than what is permitted to any user on the
Internet. That is, the victim application exposes a well-
known public interface (e.g., HTTP, FTP, KV-store proto-
8
Figure 9: An example victim web application architecture.
col) that allows incoming requests, which is also the only
access point for the attacker to the victim. The front end
of this victim application can range from caching or data
storage services (e.g., memcached, cassandra) to generic
webservers. We also assume that there may be multiple
instances of this front-end service running behind a load
balancer. Under this scenario, the attacker wishes to de-
tect co-location with one or more of the front-facing victim
VMs.
Co-residency test. We adapt the memory tests used in pre-
vious section by running the memory-locking sender in the
attacker instance. For a receiver, we use the public interface
exposed by the victim by generating a set of requests that
potentially makes the victim VMs hit the memory bus. This
can be achieved by looping through a large number of re-
quests of sizes approximately equal or greater than the size
of the LLC. This creates a performance side-channel that
leaks co-residency information. This receiver runs in an in-
dependent VM under the adversary’s control, which we call
the co-residency detector.
Experiment setup. To evaluate the efficacy of this
method, we used the Olio multi-tier web application [13]
that is designed to mimic a social-networking application.
We used an instance of this workload from CloudSuite [23].
Although Olio supports several tiers (e.g., memcached to
cache results of database queries), we configured it with
two tiers as shown in Figure 9, with each webserver and the
database server running in a separate VM of type t2.small
on Amazon EC2. Multiple of these webserver VMs are con-
figured behind a HAProxy-based load balancer [9] running
in an m3.medium instance (for better networking perfor-
mance). The load balancer follows the standard configu-
ration of using round-robin load balancing algorithm with
sticky client sessions using cookies. We believe such a
victim web application and its configuration is a reason-
able generalization of real world applications running in the
cloud.
For the attacker, we use an off-the-shelf HTTP perfor-
mance measurement utility called HTTPerf [29] as the re-
ceiver in the co-residency detection test. This receiver is
run inside a t2.micro instance (for free of charge). We used
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Figure 10: Co-residency detection on an uncooperative victim.
The graph shows the average request latency at the co-residency
detector without and with memory-locking sender running on the
co-resident attacker VM under varying background load on the
victim. Note that the y-axis is in log scale. The load is in the
number of concurrent users, where each user on average generates
20 HTTP requests per second to the webserver.
a set of 212 requests that included web pages and web ob-
jects (images, PDF files). We gathered these requests using
the access log of manual navigation around the web appli-
cation from a web browser.
Evaluation methodology. We start with a known co-
resident VM pair using the cooperative co-residency detec-
tion method. We configure one of the VMs as a victim web-
server VM and launch four more VMs: two webservers, one
database server and a load balancer, all of which are not co-
resident with the attacker VM.
Co-residency detection starts by measuring the average
request latency at the receiver inside the co-residency de-
tector for the baseline (with idle attacker) and contended
case with the attacker running the memory-locking sender.
A significant performance degradation between the baseline
and the contended case across multiple samples reveal co-
residency of one of the victim VMs with the attacker VM.
On Amazon EC2, with the above setup we observed an av-
erage request latency of 4.66ms in the baseline case and
a 10.6ms in the memory-locked case, i.e., a performance
degradation of ≈ 2.3×.
Background noise. The above test was performed when
the victim web application was idle. In reality, any victim in
the cloud might experience constant or varying background
load on the system. False positives or negatives may occur
when there is spike in load on the victim servers. In such
case, we use the same solution as in Section 4.2 — alternat-
ing between measuring the idle and the contended case.
In order to gauge the efficacy of the test under con-
stant background load, we repeated the above experiment
with varying load on the victim. The result of this exper-
9
iment is summarized in Figure 10. Counterintuitively, we
found that a constant load on the background server exac-
erbates the performance degradation gap, hence resulting in
a clearer signal of co-residency. This is because running
memory-locking on the co-resident attacker increases the
service time of all requests as majority of the requests rely
on memory bandwidth. This increases the queuing delay
in the system and in turn increasing the overall request la-
tency. Interestingly, this aforementioned performance gap
stops widening at higher loads of 750 to 1000 concurrent
users as the system hits a bottleneck (in our case a network
bottleneck at the load balancer) even without running the
memory-locking sender. Thus, detecting co-residency with
a victim VM that is part of a highly loaded and bottlenecked
application would be hard using this test.
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Figure 11: Varying number of webservers behind the load bal-
ancer. The graph shows the average request latency at the co-
residency detector without and with memory-locking sender run-
ning on the co-residency attacker VM under varying background
load on the victim. Note that the y-axis is in log scale. The error
bars show the standard deviation over 5 samples.
We also experimented with increasing the number of
victim webservers behind the load balancer beyond 3
(Figure 11). As expected, the co-residency signal grew
weaker with increasing victims, and at 9 webservers, the
performance degradation was too low to be useful for de-
tecting co-residency.
5 Placement Vulnerability Study
In this section, we evaluate three public clouds, Amazon
EC2, Google Compute Engine and Microsoft Azure, for
placement vulnerabilities and answer the following ques-
tions: (i) what are all the strategies that an adversary can
employ to increase the chance of co-location with one or
more victim VMs? (ii) what are the chances of success
and cost of each strategy? and (iii) how do these strategies
compare against the reference placement policy introduced
in Section 3?
5.1 Experimental Methodology
Before presenting the results, we first describe the exper-
iment setting and methodology that we employed for this
placement vulnerability study.
Experiment settings. Recall VM placement depends on
several placement variables (shown in Figure 1). We as-
signed reasonable values to these placement variables and
enumerated through several launch strategies. A run corre-
sponds to one launch strategy and involves launching mul-
tiple VMs from two distinct accounts (i.e., subscriptions in
Azure and projects in GCE) and checking for co-residency
between all pairs of VMs launched. One account was des-
ignated as a proxy for the victim and the other for the adver-
sary. We denote a run configuration by v×a, where v is the
number of victim instances and a is the number of attacker
instances launched in that run. We varied v and a for all v,
a ∈ {10,20,30} and restricted them to the inequality, v≤ a,
as it increases the likelihood of achieving co-residency.
Other placement variables that are part of the run con-
figuration include: victim launch time (including time of
the day, day of the week), delay between victim and at-
tacker VM launches, victim and attacker instance types and
data center location or region where the VMs are launched.
We repeat each run multiple times across all three cloud
providers. The repetition of experiments is especially re-
quired to control the effect of certain environment variables
like time of day. We repeat experiments for each run con-
figuration over various times of the day and days of the
week. We fix the instance type of VMs to small instances
(t2.small on EC2, g1.small on GCE and small or Standard-
A1 on Azure) and data center regions to us-east for EC2,
us-central1-a for GCE and east-us for Azure, unless other-
wise noted. All experiments were conducted over 3 months
between December 2014 to February 2015.
We used a single, local Intel Core i7-2600 machine with
8 SMT cores to launch VM instances, log instance informa-
tion and run the co-residency detection test suite.
Implementation and the Cloud APIs. In order to auto-
mate our experiments, we used Python and the libcloud†
library [3] to interface with EC2 and GCE. Unfortunately,
libcloud did not support Azure. The only Azure cloud
API on Linux platform was a node.js library and a cross-
platform command-line interface (CLI). We built a wrap-
per around the CLI. There were no significant differences
across different cloud APIs except that Azure did not have
any explicit interface to launch multiple VMs simultane-
ously.
As mentioned in the experiment settings, we experi-
mented with various delays between the victim and attacker
VM launches (0, 1, 2, 4 . . . hours). To save money, we
reused the same set of victim instances for each of the
†We used libcloud version 0.15.1 for EC2, and a modified version of
0.16.0 for GCE to support the use of multiple accounts in GCE.
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Delay Config. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
(hr.)
0 10x10 0.11 0.33 0 0 1
0 10x20 0.2 0.42 0 0 1
0 10x30 0.5 0.71 0 0 2
0 20x20 0.43 0.65 0 0 2
0 20x30 1.67 1.22 0 2 4
0 30x30 1.6 1.65 0 1 5
1 10x10 0.25 0.46 0 0 1
1 10x20 0.33 0.5 0 0 1
1 10x30 1.6 1.07 0 2 3
1 20x20 1.27 1.22 0 1 4
1 20x30 2.44 1.51 0 3 4
1 30x30 3 1.12 1 3 5
(a) us-central1-a
Delay Config. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
(hr.)
0 10x10 2 1.73 1 1 4
0 10x20 2.67 1.53 1 3 4
0 10x30 3 2.65 1 2 6
0 20x20 3.67 1.53 2 4 5
0 20x30 2.75 2.06 0 3 5
0 30x30 12.33 2.08 10 13 14
1 10x10 2 1 1 2 3
1 10x20 2 1 1 2 3
1 10x30 2 1.73 1 1 4
1 20x20 4.67 5.51 1 2 11
1 20x30 3.75 2.5 1 3.5 7
1 30x30 10 3 7 10 13
(b) europe-west1-b
Figure 12: Distribution of number of co-resident pairs on GCE.
Delay Config. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
(hr.)
0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0
1 10x10 0.44 0.73 0 0 2
1 10x20 1.11 1.17 0 1 3
1 10x30 1.4 1.43 0 1.5 4
1 20x20 3.57 2.59 0 3.5 9
1 20x30 3.78 1.79 1 4 7
1 30x30 3.89 2.09 2 3 9
(a) us-east
Delay Config. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
(hr.)
0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0
0 20x20 10.33 8.96 0 15 16
1 10x10 1.67 0.58 1 2 2
1 10x20 2.33 0.58 2 2 3
1 10x30 5.33 2.52 3 5 8
1 20x20 8.33 4.51 4 8 13
1 20x30 5.5 3.87 2 4.5 11
1 30x30 8.33 6.66 4 5 16
(b) us-west-1 (CA)
Figure 13: Distribution of number of co-resident pairs on EC2.
Delay (hr.) Config. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
0 10x10 15.22 19.51 0 14 64
0 10x20 3.78 4.71 0 3 14
0 10x30 4.25 6.41 0 2.5 19
0 20x20 9.67 8.43 0 8 27
0 20x30 2.38 1.51 1 2 5
0 30x30 24.57 36.54 1 6 99
1 10x10 2.78 3.87 0 1 12
1 10x20 0.78 1.2 0 0 3
1 10x30 0.75 1.39 0 0 3
1 20x20 0.67 1.66 0 0 5
1 20x30 0.86 0.9 0 1 2
1 30x30 4.71 9.89 0 1 27
Figure 14: Distribution of number of co-resident pairs on
Azure. Region: East US 1.
longer runs. That is, for the run configuration of 10x10 with
0, 1, 2, and 4 hours of delay between victim and attacker
VM launches, we launched the victim VMs only once at the
start of the experiment. After running co-residency tests on
the first set of VM pairs, we terminated all the attacker in-
stances and relaunched attacker VM instances after appro-
priate delays (say 1 hour) and rerun the tests with the same
set of victim VMs. We repeat this until we experiment with
all delays for this configuration. We call this methodology
the leap-frog method. It is also important to note that zero
delay here means parallel launch of VMs from our test ma-
chine (and not sequential launch of VMs from one account
after another), unless otherwise noted.
In the sections below, we take a closer look at the ef-
fect of varying one placement variable while keeping other
variables fixed across all the cloud providers. In each case,
we use three metrics to measure the degree of co-residency:
chances of getting at least one co-resident instance across
a number of runs (or success rate), average number of co-
resident instances over multiple runs and average coverage
(i.e., fraction of victim VMs with which attacker VMs were
co-resident). Although these experiments were done with
victim VMs under our control, the results can be extrapo-
11
lated to guide an attacker’s launch strategy for an uncoop-
erative victim. We also discuss a set of such strategic ques-
tions that the results help answer. At the end of this section,
we summarize and calculate the cost of several interesting
launch strategies and evaluate the public clouds against our
reference placement policy.
5.2 Effect of Number of Instances
In this section, we observe the placement behavior while
varying the number of victim and attacker instances. Intu-
itively, we expect the chances of co-residency to increase
with the number of attacker and victim instances.
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Figure 15: Chances of co-residency of 10 victim instances with
varying number of attacker instances. All these results are
from one data center region (EC2: us-east, GCE: us-central1-a,
Azure: East US) and the delays between victim and attacker in-
stance launch were 1 hour. Results are over at least 9 runs per run
configuration with at least 3 runs per time of day.
Varying number of attacker instances. Keeping all the
placement variables constant including the number of vic-
tim instances, we measure the chance of co-residency over
multiple runs. The result of this experiment helps to answer
the question: How many VMs should an adversary launch
to increase the chance of co-residency?
As is shown in Figure 15, the placement behavior
changes across different cloud providers. For GCE and
EC2, we observe that higher the number of attacker in-
stances relative to the victim instances, the higher the
chance of co-residency is. Figure 12(a) and 13(a) show the
distribution of number of co-resident VM pairs on GCE and
EC2, respectively. The number of co-resident VM pairs
also increases with the number of attacker instances, imply-
ing that the coverage of an attack could be increased with
larger fraction of attacker instances than the target VM in-
stances if the launch times are coordinated.
Contrary to our expectations, the placement behavior ob-
served on Azure is the inverse. The chances of co-residency
with 10 attacker instances are almost twice as high as
with 30 attacker instances. This is also reflected in the
distribution of number of co-residency VM pairs (shown
in Figure 14). Further investigation revealed a correla-
tion between the number of victim and attacker instances
launched and the chance of co-residency. That is, for the
run configuration of 10x10, 20x20 and 30x30, where num-
ber of victim and attacker instances are the same, and with
0 delay, the chance of co-residency were equally high for
all these configurations (between 0.9 to 1). This suggests a
possible placement policy that collates VM launch requests
together based on their request size and places them on the
same group of machines.
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Figure 16: Chances of co-residency of 30 attacker instances
with varying number of victim instances. All these results are
from one data center region (EC2: us-east, GCE: us-central1-a,
Azure: East US) and the delays between victim and attacker in-
stance launch were 1 hour. Results are over at least 9 runs per run
configuration with at least 3 runs per time of day.
Varying number of victim instances. Similarly, we also
varied the number of victim instances by keeping the num-
ber of attacker instances and other placement variables con-
stant (results shown in Figure 16). We expect the chance
of co-residency to increase with the number of victims tar-
geted. Hence, the results presented here help an adversary
answer the question: What are the chances of co-residency
with varying sizes of target victims?
As expected, we see an increase in the chances of co-
residency with increasing number of victim VMs across
all cloud providers. We see that the absolute value of the
chance of co-residency is lower for Azure than other clouds.
This may be the result of significant additional delay be-
tween victim and attacker launch times in Azure as a result
of our methodology (more on this later).
5.3 Effect of Instance Launch Time
In this section, we answer two questions that aid an adver-
sary to design better launch strategies: How quickly should
12
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Figure 17: Chances of co-residency with varying delays be-
tween victim and attacker launches. Solid boxes correspond
to zero delay (simultaneous launches) and gauze-like boxes cor-
respond to 1 hour delay between victim and attacker launches. We
did not observe any co-resident instances for runs with zero delay
on EC2. All these results are from one data center region (EC2:
us-east, GCE: us-central1-a, Azure: East US). Results are over at
least 9 runs per run configuration with at least 3 runs per time of
day.
Delay Mean S.D. Min Median Max Success
rate
0+ 0.6 1.07 0 0 3 0.30
5 min 1.38 0.92 0 1 3 0.88
1 hr 3.57 2.59 0 3.5 9 0.86
Figure 18: Distribution of number of co-resident pairs and suc-
cess rate or chances of co-residency for shorter delays under
20x20 run configuration in EC2. A delay with 0+ means victim
and attacker instances were launched sequentially, i.e. attacker in-
stances were not launched until all victim instances were running.
The results averaged are over 9 runs with 3 runs per time of day.
an attacker launch VMs after the victim VMs are launched?
Is there any increase in chance associated with the time of
day of the launch?
Varying delay between attacker and victim
launches. The result of varying the delay between
0 (i.e., parallel launch) and 1 hour delay is shown
in Figure 17. We can make two immediate observations
from this result.
The first observation reveals a significant artifact of
EC2’s placement policy: VMs launched within a short time
window are never co-resident on the same machine. This
observation helps an adversary to avoid such a strategy.
We further investigated placement behaviors on EC2 with
shorter non-zero delays in order to find the duration of this
time window in which there are zero co-residency (results
shown in Figure 18). We found that this time window is
very short and that even a sequential launch of instances
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Figure 19: Chances of co-residency over long periods. Results
include 9 runs over two weeks with 3 runs per time of day under
20x20 run configuration. Note that we only conducted 3 runs for
32 hour delay as opposed to 9 runs for all other delays.
(denoted by 0+) could result in co-residency.
The second observation shows that non-zero delay on
GCE and zero delay on Azure increases the chance of co-
residency and hence directly benefits an attacker. It should
be noted that on Azure, the launch delays between victim
and attacker instances were longer than 1 hour due to our
leap-frog experimental methodology; the actual delays be-
tween the VM launches were, on average, 3 hours (with
a maximum delay of 10 hours for few runs). This higher
delay was more common in runs with larger number of
instances as there were significantly more false positives,
which required a separate sequential phase to resolve (see
Section 4.2).
We also experimented with longer delays on EC2 and
GCE to understand whether and how quickly the chance
of co-residency drops with increasing delay (results shown
in Figure 19). Contrary to our expectation, we did not find
the chance of co-residency to drop to zero even for delays
as high as 16 and 32 hours. We speculate that the reason for
this observation could be that the system was under constant
churn where some neighboring VMs on the victim’s ma-
chine were terminated. Note that our leap-frog methodol-
ogy may, in theory, interfere with the VM placement. But it
is noteworthy that we observed increased number of unique
co-resident pairs with increasing delays, suggesting fresh
co-residency with victim VMs over longer delays.
Effect of time of day. Prior works have shown that churn
or load is often correlated with the time of day [33]. Our
simple reference placement policy does not have a notion
of load and hence have no effect on time of day. In reality,
with limited number of servers in datacenters and limited
number of capacity per host, load on the system has direct
effect on the placement behavior of any placement policy.
As expected, we observe small effect on VM place-
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Chances of Co-residency
Cloud Morning Afternoon Night
02:00 - 10:00 10:00 - 18:00 18:00 - 02:00
GCE 0.68 0.61 0.78
EC2 0.89 0.73 0.6
Figure 20: Effect of time of day. Chances of co-residency when
an attacker changes the launch time of his instances. The results
were aggregated across all run configurations with 1 hour delay
between victim and attacker launch times. All times are in PT.
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Figure 21: Median number of co-resident pairs across two re-
gions. The box plot shows the median number of co-resident pairs
excluding co-residency within the same account. Results are over
at least 3 run per run configuration (x-axis).
ment based on the time of day when attacker instances are
launched (results shown in Figure 20). Specifically, there is
a slightly higher chance of co-residency if the attacker in-
stances are launched in the early morning for EC2 and at
night for GCE.
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Figure 22: Distribution of number of co-resident instances per
host on Azure. The results shown are across all the runs. We saw
at most 2 instances per host in EC2 and at most 3 instances per
host in GCE.
5.4 Effect of Data Center Location
All the above experiments were conducted on relatively
popular regions in each cloud (especially true for EC2 [33]).
In this section, we report the results on other smaller and
less popular regions. As the regions are less popular
and have relatively fewer machines, we expect higher co-
residency rates and more co-resident instances. Figure 21
shows the median number of co-resident VM pairs placed in
these regions alongside the results for popular regions. The
distribution of number of co-resident instances is shown
in Figure 12(b) and 13(b).
The main observation from these experiments is that
there is a higher chance of co-residency in these smaller
regions than the larger, more popular regions. Note that we
placed at least one co-resident pair in all the runs in these
regions. Also the higher number of co-resident pairs also
suggests a larger coverage over victim VMs in these smaller
regions.
One anomaly that we found during two 20x20 runs on
EC2 between 30th and 31st of January 2015, when we ob-
served an unusually large number of co-resident instances
(including three VMs from the same account). We believe
this anomaly may be a result of an internal management in-
cident in the Amazon EC2 us-west-1 region.
5.5 Other Observations
We report several other interesting observations in this sec-
tion. First, we found more than two VMs can be co-resident
on the same host on both Azure and GCE, but not on EC2.
Figure 22 shows the distribution of number of co-resident
instances per host. Particularly, in one of the runs, we
placed 16 VMs on a single host.
Another interesting observation is related to co-resident
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Figure 23: Launch strategy and co-residency detection execu-
tion times. The run configurations v× a indicates the number of
victims vs. number of attackers launched. The error bars show the
standard deviation across at least 7 runs.
Run Average Cost ($) Maximum Cost ($)
config. GCE EC2 Azure GCE EC2 Azure
10x10 0.137 0.260 0.494 0.140 0.260 0.819
10x20 0.370 0.520 1.171 0.412 0.520 1.358
10x30 1.049 0.780 2.754 1.088 1.560 3.257
20x20 0.770 0.520 2.235 1.595 1.040 3.255
20x30 1.482 1.560 3.792 1.581 1.560 4.420
30x30 1.866 1.560 5.304 2.433 1.560 7.965
Figure 24: Cost of running a launch strategy (in dollars). Max-
imum cost column refers to the maximum cost we incurred out
of all the runs for that particular configuration and cloud provider.
The cost per hour of small instances at the time of this study were:
0.05, 0.026 and 0.06 dollars for GCE, EC2 and Azure, respec-
tively. The minimum and maximum costs are in bold.
instances from the same account. We term them as self-
co-resident instances. We observed many self-co-resident
pairs on GCE and Azure (not shown). On the other hand,
we never noticed any self co-resident pair on EC2 except
for the anomaly in us-west-1. Although we did not notice
any effect on the actual chance of co-residence, we believe
such placement behaviors (or the lack of) may affect VM
placement.
We also experimented with medium instances and suc-
cessfully placed few co-located VMs on both EC2 and
GCE by employing similar successful strategies learned
with small instances.
5.6 Cost of Launch Strategies
Recall that the cost of a launch strategy from Section 3,
CS = a∗P(atype)∗Td(v,a). In order to calculate this cost, we
need Td(v,a) which is the time taken to detect co-location
with a attackers and v victims. Figure 23 shows the av-
erage time taken to complete launching attacker instances
Run Config. 10x10 10x20 10x30 20x20 20x30 30x30
Pr [Eva > 0 ] 0.10 0.18 0.26 0.33 0.45 0.60
Figure 25: Probability of co-residency under the reference
placement policy.
and complete co-residency detection for each run config-
uration. Here the measured co-residency detection is the
parallelized version discussed in Section 4.2 and also in-
cludes time taken to detect co-residency within each tenant
account. Hence, for these reasons the time to detect co-
location is an upper bound for a realistic and highly opti-
mized co-residency detection mechanism.
We calculate the cost of executing each launch strat-
egy under the three public clouds. The result is summa-
rized in Figure 24. Note that we only consider the cost in-
curred by the compute instances because the cost for other
resources such as network and storage, was insignificant.
Also note that EC2 bills every hour even if an instance runs
less than an hour [17], whereas GCE and Azure charge per
minute of instance activity. This difference is considered
in our cost calculation. Overall, the maximum cost we in-
curred was about $8 for running 30 VMs for 4 hours 25
minutes on Azure and a minimum of 14 cents on GCE for
running 10 VMs for 17 minutes. We incurred the highest
cost for all the launch strategies in Azure because of overall
higher cost per hour and partly due to longer tests due to
our co-residency detection methodology.
5.7 Summary of Placement Vulnerabilities
In this section, we return to the secure reference placement
policy introduced in Section 3 and use it to identify place-
ment vulnerabilities across all the three clouds. Recall that
the probability of at least one pair of co-residency under
this random placement policy is given by Pr [Eva > 0 ] =
1− (1− v/N)a, where Eva is the random variable denoting
the number of co-location observed when placing a attacker
VMs among N = 1000 total machines where v machines
are already picked for the v victim VMs. First, we evaluate
this probability for various run configurations that we ex-
perimented with in the public clouds. The probabilities are
shown in Figure 25.
Recall that a launch strategy in a cloud implies a place-
ment vulnerability in that cloud’s placement policy if its
normalized success rate is greater than 1. The normalized
success rate of the strategy is the ratio of the chance of co-
location under that launch strategy to the probability of co-
location in the reference policy (Pr [Eva > 0 ]). Below is a
list of selected launch strategies that escalate to placement
vulnerabilities using our reference policy with their normal-
ized success rate in parenthesis.
(S1) In Azure, launch ten attacker VMs closely after the
victim VMs are launched (1.0/0.10).
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Strategy v & a a′ Cost benefit ($) Normalized
success
S1 & S2 10 688 113.87 10
S3 30 227 32.75 1.67
S4(i) 20 105 4.36 2.67
S4(ii) 20 342 53.76 3.03
S5 20 110 4.83 1.48
Figure 26: Cost benefit analysis. N = 1000, P(atype) = 0.026,
which is the cost per instance-hour on EC2 (the cheapest). For
simplicity Td(v,a) = (v ∗ a) ∗ 3.85, where 3.85 is fastest average
time to detect co-residency per instance-pair. Here, v× a is the
run configuration of the strategy under test. Note that the cost
benefit is the additional cost incurred under the reference policy,
hence is equal to cost incurred by a′−a additional VMs.
(S2) In EC2 and GCE, if there are known victims in any of
the smaller datacenters, launch at least ten attacker VMs
with a non-zero delay (1.0/0.10).
(S3) In all three clouds, launch 30 attacker instances, either
with no delay (Azure) or one hour delay (EC2, GCE)
from victim launch, to get co-located with one of the 30
victim instances (1.00/0.60).
(S4) (i) In Amazon EC2, launch 20 attacker VMs with a
delay of 5 minutes or more after the victims are launched
(0.88/0.33). (ii) The optimal delay between victim and
attacker VM launches is around 4 hours for a 20x20 run
(1.00/0.33).
(S5) In Amazon EC2, launch the attacker VMs with 1 hour
after the victim VMs are launched where the time of day
falls in the early morning, i.e., 02:00 to 10:00hrs PST
(0.89/0.60).
Cost benefit. Next, we quantify the cost benefit of each
of these strategies over the reference policy. As the success
rate of any launch strategy on a vulnerable placement pol-
icy is greater than what is possible in the reference policy,
we need more attacker instances in the reference policy to
achieve the same success rate. We calculate this number
of attacker instances a′ using: a′ = ln(1−Sva)/ ln(1−v/N),
where, Sva is the success rate of a strategy with run config-
uration of v× a. The result of this calculation is presented
in Figure 26. The result shows that the best strategy, S1 and
S2, on all three cloud providers is $114 cheaper than what
is possible in the reference policy.
It is also evident that these metrics enable evaluating and
comparing various launch strategies and their efficacy on
various placement policies both on robust placements and
attack cost. For example, note that although the normal-
ized success rate of S3 is lower than S4, it has a higher cost
benefit for the attacker.
5.8 Limitations
Although we exhaustively experimented with a variety of
placement variables, the results have limitations. One ma-
jor limitation of this study is the number of placement vari-
ables and the set of values for the variables that we used to
experiment. For example, we limited our experiments with
only one instance type, one availability zone per region and
used only one account for the victim VMs. Although dif-
ferent instance types may exhibit different placement be-
havior, the presented results hold strong for the chosen in-
stance type. The only caveat that may affect the results
is if the placement policy uses account ID for VM place-
ment decisions. Since, we experimented with only one vic-
tim account (separate from the designated attacker account)
across all providers, these results, in the worst case, may
have captured the placement behavior of an unlucky vic-
tim account that was subject to similar placement decisions
(and hence co-resident) as that of the VMs from the desig-
nated attacker account.
Even though we ran at least 190 runs per cloud provider
over a period of 3 months to increase statistical significant
of our results, we were still limited to at most 9 runs per
run configuration (with 3 runs per time of day). These lim-
itations have only minor bearing on the results presented, if
any, and the reported results are significant and impactful
for cloud computing security research.
6 Related Work
VM placement vulnerability studies. Ristenpart et
al. [30] first studied the placement vulnerability in public
clouds, which showed that a malicious cloud tenant could
place one of his VMs on the same machine as a target
VM with high probability. Placement vulnerabilities ex-
ploited in their study include publicly available mapping of
VM’s public/internal IP addresses, disclosure of Dom0 IP
addresses, and a shortcut communication path between co-
resident VMs. Their study was followed by Xu et al. [35]
and further extended by Herzberg et al. [26]. However, the
results of these studies have been outdated by the recent
development of cloud technologies, which is the main mo-
tivation of our work.
Concurrent with our work, Xu et al. [36] conducted a sys-
tematic measurement study of co-resident threats in Ama-
zon EC2. Their focus, however, is in-depth evaluation
of co-residency detection using network route traces and
quantification of co-residence threats on older generation
instances with EC2’s classic networking (prior to Amazon
VPC). In contrast, we study placement vulnerabilities in the
context of VPC on EC2, as well as on Azure and GCE. The
two studies are mostly complementary and strengthen the
arguments made by each other.
New VM placement policies to defend against placement
attacks have been studied by Han et al. [24, 25] and Azar
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et al. [19]. It is unclear, however, whether their proposed
policies work against the performance and reliability goals
of public cloud providers.
Co-residency detection techniques. Techniques for co-
residency detection have been studied in various contexts.
We categorize these techniques into one of the two classes:
side-channel approaches to detecting co-residency with un-
cooperative VMs and covert-channel approaches to detect-
ing co-residency with cooperative VMs.
Side-channels allow one party to exfiltrate secret infor-
mation from another; therefore these approaches may be
adapted in practical placement attack scenarios with targets
not controlled by the attackers. Network round-trip timing
side-channel was used by Ristenpart et al. [30] to detect
co-residency. Zhang et al. [38] developed a system called
HomeAlone to enable VMs to detect third-party VMs us-
ing timing side-channels in the last level caches. Bates et
al. [20] proposed a side-channel for co-residency detection
by causing network traffic congestion in the host NICs from
attacker-controlled VMs; the interference of target VM’s
performance, if the two VMs are co-resident, should be de-
tectable by remote clients. Kohno et al. [28] explored tech-
niques to fingerprint remote machines using timestamps in
TCP or ICMP based network probes, although their ap-
proach was not designed for co-residency detection. How-
ever, none of these approaches works effectively in modern
cloud infrastructures.
Covert-channels on shared hardware components can be
used for co-residency detection when both VMs under test
are cooperative. Coarse-grained covert-channels in CPU
caches and hard disk drives were used in Ristenpart et
al. [30] for co-residency confirmation. Xu et al. [35] estab-
lished covert-channels in shared last level caches between
two colluding VMs in the public clouds. Wu el al. [34]
exploited memory bus as a covert-channel on modern x86
processors, in which the sender issues atomic operations
on memory blocks spanning multiple cache lines to cause
memory bus locking or similar effects on recent processors.
However, covert-channels proposed in the latter two studies
were not designed for co-residency detection, while those
developed in our work are tuned for this purpose.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Multi-tenancy in public clouds enable co-residency attacks.
In this paper, we revisited the problem of placement —
can an attacker achieve co-location? — in modern public
clouds. We find that while past techniques for verifying co-
location no longer work, insufficient performance isolation
in hardware still allows detection of co-location. Further-
more, we show that in the three popular cloud providers
(EC2, GCE and Azure), achieving co-location is surpris-
ingly simple and cheap. It is even simpler and costs nothing
to achieve co-location in some PaaS clouds. Our results
demonstrate that even though cloud providers have massive
datacenters with numerous physical servers, the chances of
co-location are far higher than expected. More work is
needed to achieve a better balance of efficiency and secu-
rity using smarter co-location-aware placement policies.
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